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Abstract Two studies investigated the cognitive activa-
tion of a goal following a promise to complete it. Current
theorizing about the impact of positive affect as informa-
tional feedback in goal pursuit suggests two contradictory
conclusions: (1) positive affect can signal that sufﬁcient
progress towards a goal has been made, but also (2) posi-
tive affect can signal that commitment to a goal should be
maintained. When individuals infer that signiﬁcant pro-
gress toward goal achievement has been made, the goal
should be deactivated, but when individuals infer that
commitment to the goal should be maintained, goal acti-
vation should be increased. To determine the conditions in
which positive affect leads to increased goal activation as
opposed to goal deactivation, we proposed that competing
goals serve as a moderator. We found that positive affect
led to decreased goal activation when competing goals
were present, but to increased goal activation when com-
peting goals were absent.
Keywords Positive affect  Goals  Motivation 
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Introduction
Goals are conceptualized as stored knowledge structures
that can vary in their activation level at a given moment
(Bargh 1990; Kruglanski 1996a). When goals are being
pursued, they remain cognitively activated. However, when
a goal has been attained or when sufﬁcient progress has
been made, the information associated with it is deacti-
vated or inhibited (Forster et al. 2005; Marsh et al. 1998;
Zeigarnik 1927).
Once a goal has been adopted and its pursuit has been
initiated, the actor monitors the progress that has been
made toward the goal (Atkinson and Raynor 1978; Carver
and Scheier 1998; Feather 1990; Gollwitzer 1999; Locke
and Latham 1990). Many types of information may serve
as feedback on the status of goal-directed action, including
thoughts about the goal (Fishbach and Dhar 2006; Oettingen
and Mayer 2002), affect associated with the goal (Carver
and Scheier 1990; Clore et al. 2001), and action toward the
goal (Fishbach and Dhar 2006). In the present research, we
focused speciﬁcally on the role of positive affect as feed-
back information allowing for adjustment in the activation
level of adopted goals.
Current theorizing about the impact of positive affect as
informational feedback in goal pursuit suggests two con-
tradictory conclusions. Positive affect may signal that
commitment to a goal should be maintained, indicating that
the goal should remain activated. Conversely, the experi-
enceofpositiveaffectmaysignalthatsufﬁcientprogresshas
been made, indicating that the goal can be deactivated and
that resources can be shifted to another goal system
(Kruglanski et al. 2002). We propose that it is the presence
(vs.absence)ofacompetinggoalsystemthatdetermineshow
feedback information derived from positive affect is inter-
preted. To test our predictions, two laboratory experiments
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Feedback information
Researchers have investigated speciﬁc types of information
that may serve as evidence as to whether sufﬁcient progress
toward a goal has been made, or whether continued commit-
ment of resources to the pursuit of the goal is needed. To
manipulate perceived commitment versus progress, Fishbach
and Dhar (2006) asked participants to complete a question-
naire about their goal progress in which the comparison point
was either very far from or very close to what the participant
had already accomplished. When the comparison point was
very far, suggesting low progress (in this case augmenting
commitment), participants engaged in goal-consistent
behavior. However, when the comparison point was very
close, suggesting considerable goal progress, participants
engaged in goal-inconsistent behavior. In other words, infor-
mation implying that sufﬁcient progress toward the goal has
been made may lead to deactivation of the goal, whereas
informationsuggestingthatcommitmenttothegoalshouldbe
maintainedmayleadtocontinuedorincreasedgoalactivation.
Positive affect
One particularly important source of feedback in goal
pursuit is positive affect. As argued below, in some con-
ditions the experience of positive affect might lead to an
increase in goal activation, whereas in other circumstances
it might lead to a decrease in goal activation. We will
consider each in turn.
Consider ﬁrst the possibility that positive affect may lead
to continued or increased activation of a goal. The experi-
ence of positive affect may signal that a goal is desirable,
enjoyable, or attainable. This would be expected to increase
the activation of the goal and to inspire increased goal-
directed behavior. As stated by Clore et al. (2001, p. 43),
‘‘positive affective cues serve as an incentive, reward, or
‘go’ signal for using currently accessible information and
pursuing currently accessible inclinations.’’ Moreover,
‘‘whether experienced as self-conﬁdence, as success, or as
an indication that one’s beliefs and expectations are valid,
positive affect should serve as a go signal (or reward) … for
using whatever goal, strategy, information, or response is
most accessible’’ (Clore et al. 2001, p. 43).
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that positive affect
increases commitment to goals. For example, Custers and
Aarts (2005) found that subliminal priming of goals led to
greater goal commitment when positively-valenced adjec-
tives were paired with the primes as compared to when
neutral or negatively-valenced adjectives were paired with
the primes. Similarly, Fishbach and Labroo (2007) found
that induced positive affect prior to goal priming led to
greater commitment to goals than when negative affect was
induced. Therefore, they concluded that ‘‘positive mood
serves as a booster, facilitating the adoption of accessible
goals’’ (Fishbach and Labroo 2007, p. 169). This recent
researchprovidesempiricalsupportforthe theoreticalclaim
that positive affect serves as a ‘‘go’’ signal.
Yet alternative considerations suggest that positive affect
may prompt the deactivation of a goal. Carver and Scheier’s
(1990, 1998) cybernetic control model proposes that indi-
vidualsmonitortherateofprogresstowardagoalinreference
to a relevant criterion. When progress exceeds the criterion,
positive affect is experienced. This may occur because the
person exceeds the expected rate of progress or because the
person passes some pertinent reference point. According to
the cybernetic model, when such a threshold is reached, the
actor deactivates the goal. This model suggests that when
positiveaffectisexperienced,itshouldleadtocoastingonthe
focal goal in the form of diminished effort (Carver 2003).
Some evidence exists suggesting that positive affect can
indeed lead to both the increased and decreased activation
of a goal. When participants were given a performance-
based stop-rule, (‘‘continue working until you reach your
objective’’), then positive affect was related to less per-
sistence on tasks, but when given an enjoyment-based stop-
rule was given (‘‘continue working until the task is no
longer enjoyable’’), positive affect was associated with
greater persistence on a task (Hirt et al. 1996).
Ouranalysisandtheempiricalevidencereviewedsuggest
that positive affect should sometimes lead to increased
activation of an adopted goal, but should lead to the deac-
tivation of an adopted goal under other circumstances.
Positiveaffectshouldlead toincreasedgoal activation when
it signals commitment to the goal, whereas positive affect
should lead to decreased goal activation when it signals that
sufﬁcient progress towards the goal has been made.
But, how does the actor determine whether the affect is
signaling progress or commitment? Typically, information
is used in a way that that ﬁts the needs of the individual at a
given moment, a phenomenon known as ‘‘motivated rea-
soning’’ (Dunning 1999; Kunda 1990, Kunda and Sinclair
1999; Kruglanski 1989, 1996b). This suggests that the
individual’s interpretation about progress or continued
commitment might be affected by her or his momentary
needs and interests. We therefore expect that positive affect
will lead to decreased goal activation when the actor has a
motivation to believe that sufﬁcient progress has been made
on the focal goal, but increased goal activation when the
actor is motivated to believe that commitment to the focal
goal should be maintained. In the context of goal pursuit, a
central motivation may emanate from the competition
among goals for a limited pool of available resources.
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Because the deactivation of the focal goal frees resources
for alternative goal systems (Kruglanski et al. 2002), the
presence of competing goals represents a speciﬁc condition
that can be expected to have an impact on the motivation to
infer progress versus commitment to a goal. When com-
peting goals are present, the individual is motivated to infer
progress on the current task because an alternative goal
system requires resources. In the absence of competing
goals, the primary processing motivation should be to
perceive the focal goal as attainable and desirable, leading
to increased goal activation.
Based on these considerations, we predict that the
presence of competing goals will motivate the actor to use
positive affect as information indicating that sufﬁcient
progress towards the focal goal has been made, leading to
decreased goal activation. Conversely, the absence of
competing goals should motivate the actor to use positive
affect as information indicating that commitment to the
goal should be maintained, leading to increased goal
activation.
The present research
In our ﬁrst experiment, we manipulated the presence versus
absence of competing goals, with the expectation that in
the absence of competing goals the primary processing
motivation is to infer continued commitment to the focal
goal whereas in the presence of competing goals the pri-
mary processing motivation is to infer progress on the focal
goal. Because an inference of commitment should lead to
an increase in goal activation and an inference of progress
should lead to a decrease in goal activation, we predicted
that when competing goals are absent, induced positive
affect (vs. neutral affect) should lead to greater focal goal
activation, whereas when competing goals are present,
positive affect (vs. neutral affect) should lead to a lesser
activation of the focal goal. Our second experiment was
designed to conceptually replicate the ﬁndings from
Experiment 1 using a measure of participants’ behavioral
intentions rather than the reaction time measure of goal
activation used in the ﬁrst experiment. If this pattern of
results is found across the studies, it would suggest an
important moderator determining when positive affect
leads to the continued activation or deactivation of a goal.
Experiment 1
The predictions outlined above suggest that positive affect
can lead to the deactivation of a goal under some
conditions. However, theorists have generally assumed that
the stronger the adoption of a goal, the more effort a person
will exert towards the goal and the greater the likelihood
that the goal will be pursued and attained (e.g., Carver and
Scheier 1990; Locke and Latham 1990). Therefore, to
appropriately test the hypothesis that participants deacti-
vate the goal due to an inference of progress, we must be
sure that participants ﬁrmly and genuinely intend to com-
plete the goal. To accomplish this, participants were asked
to generate goals ideographically to be sure that they had a
genuine interest in pursuing the goals. In addition, partic-
ipants wrote a promise to complete the goal to be sure of
participants’ adoption of the goal.
Participants ﬁrst generated one interpersonal goal and
thought about it for 2 min. They then entered one word
into the computer to represent this goal. To manipulate
the presence versus absence of competing goals, partici-
pants listed goals that they wanted to attain later that day
or goals that had already been completed. Participants
then promised to complete their focal goal. Following
this, participants were presented with pictures in order to
induce positive or neutral affect. Finally, participants
completed a lexical decision task in which the word
representing their focal goal was included. The reaction
time to that word served as the dependent measure of goal
activation.
Method
Participants
Seventy-six undergraduate students at the University of
Maryland (47 female, 29 male) participated in exchange
for course credit. Participants were 18–28 years of age,
with a mean age of 20.
Materials and procedure
Participants completed all procedures on a desktop com-
puter. First, to activate an interpersonal goal, they were
asked to think about something they would like to do for
another person. Participants were given the following
instructions:
… think about something that you would like to do
for someone close to you, such as your signiﬁcant
other, close friend, or close relative. It should not be
too trivial such as responding to an email if you email
each other regularly. Nor should it be too large such
as making a marriage proposal. Please think about
exactly what you would like to do and how you will
do it for 2 minutes.
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ticipants to enter one word to ‘‘summarize or stand for the
action’’ they thought about (see Shah and Kruglanski
2003). Participants entered a large variety of goals, such
as ‘‘visit,’’ ‘‘surprise,’’ ‘‘gift,’’ ‘‘dinner,’’ and ‘‘shoes.’’
Making the promise
Participants were asked to write a pledge to complete the
activity that they indicated they would like to do for
someone else. They were instructed to start their written
statement with ‘‘I promise…’’
Competing goals
Immediately after thinking about the interpersonal goal,
and before promising to complete the goal, the presence
(vs. absence) of competing goals was manipulated by
randomly assigning participants to one of two conditions.
To activate competing goals, participants were asked to list
three activities they ‘‘would like to accomplish today.’’ In
the control condition competing goals were not activated,
and instead participants listed three activities they ‘‘had
already accomplished today.’’
Affect manipulation
After promising, affect was induced by randomly assigning
participants to one of two conditions (positive vs. neutral
affect). In both conditions, participants were told they
would be presented with a series of pictures prior to per-
forming a word recognition task. Five pictures from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al.
2005) were presented to participants for 12 s each, totaling
1 min of exposure. In the positive affect condition, ﬁve
pictures were presented that had been extensively pre-
tested to arouse positive affect (e.g., a smiling baby). In the
neutral affect condition, ﬁve pictures were presented that
had been extensively pre-tested to be affectively neutral
(e.g., a blue towel).
The pictures from the IAPS used in the positive mood
condition (with mean valence on a 9-point scale as reported
in the IAPS manual in parentheses) were images 1920
(M = 7.90), 2050 (M = 8.20), 2340 (M = 8.03), 5833
(M = 8.22), and 7502 (M = 7.75). The pictures presented
in the neutral mood condition were images 2102 (M =
5.16), 5130 (M = 4.45), 7006 (M = 4.88), 7036 (M =
4.88), and 7002 (M = 4.97). To test the efﬁcacy of this
manipulation using our procedure with University of
Maryland undergraduates, we presented these sets of ima-
ges to 50 students using the same procedure and instruc-
tions as in our two experiments. We then assessed
participants’ mood by asking them to rate on a 7-point
scale how positive, good, and pleasant they were feeling at
that moment (a = .96). Participants reported being in a
more positive mood after viewing the positive pictures
(M = 5.12) than after viewing the neutral pictures (M =
4.52), t(48) = 2.04, p\.05. Taken together with the
extensive pre-testing conducted by Lang et al. (2005), this
constitutes strong evidence that this affect induction had
the intended effect on participants’ mood.
Goal activation
Finally, participants completed a lexical decision task in
which their goal-relevant word was embedded. The reac-
tion time to this word served as a measure of the activation
of its associated goal. Participants were instructed that the
task required them to indicate as quickly and as accurately
as possible whether a string of letters constituted a mean-
ingful word or not. An X marked the location on the
computer screen in which the word was to appear and was
displayed for 2 s, followed by the letter string. Participants
pressed one key if the letter string represented a meaningful
word and a different key if it did not. Participants
responded to an equal number of each response type over
the course of the trials. Speciﬁcally, participants were
presented with the word that was entered to represent their
interpersonal goal (ideographically), six non-words (e.g.,
pind), and ﬁve neutral words (e.g., table). The presentation
order of the targets was randomly determined for each
participant. Prior to completing the measurement trials,
participants completed six practice trials to orient them to
the nature of the task.
The trial of interest in this experiment was the one in
which the word representing the interpersonal goal was
displayed and responded to. The response latency for this
word was used as a measure of goal activation (see Shah
and Kruglanski 2003). Faster reaction times to the words
indicated greater goal activation. Because participants
generated the goal ideographically, it was only possible to
use the self-generated word in the lexical decision task
rather than multiple words that may relate to the goal. If
this word had been presented multiple times, the ﬁrst
presentation may have inﬂuenced response latencies to the
subsequent presentations. For this reason, the word repre-
senting each interpersonal goal was presented only once.
The response latencies to the neutral words were also
recorded, and the average of the response latencies across
the six words served as a composite reﬂecting individual
differences in responding to this task generally.
All response latencies were logarithmically transformed
to lessen the inﬂuence of outliers (cf. Fazio 1990). Because
the speed of participants’ incorrect responses would have
been difﬁcult to interpret in terms of accessibility, only
correct responses were used in data analysis (see Bargh
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words representing their focal goal, therefore no partici-
pants were excluded for this reason.
Results and discussion
Weconducteda2(competinggoals: present vs.absent) 9 2
(affect: positive vs. neutral) between-subjects ANCOVA,
with response latencies to neutral words entered as a
covariate. The results found support for the predicted two-
way interaction between the presence of competing goals
and affect, F(1, 71) = 7.50, p\.01. To further test our
hypotheses, we analyzed the simple effects. When compet-
ing goals were present, reaction times to the focal goal were
signiﬁcantly slower in the positive affect condition
(M = 680 ms, SE = 31) than in the neutral affect condition
(M = 595 ms, SE = 29), t(71) = 2.11, p\.05. When
competinggoalswereabsent,reactiontimestothefocalgoal
were signiﬁcantly faster in the positive affect condition
(M = 561 ms, SE = 32) than in the neutral affect condition
(M = 627 ms, SE = 29), t(71) = 2.02, p\.05 (Fig. 1).
In addition to the results discussed above, we expected
that experiencing positive affect after promising to com-
plete the goal should lead to greater goal activation when
competing goals were absent as compared to when com-
peting goals were present. Conﬁrming this prediction,
reaction times to the focal goal after experiencing positive
affect were slower in the competing goals condition
(M = 680 ms, SE = 31) than when competing goals were
not activated (M = 561 ms, SE = 32), t(71) = 2.82,
p\.001. However, there was no effect of competing goals
in the neutral affect condition, t(71) = 1.24, ns.
The results from this experiment support our hypothe-
ses. When competing goals were present at the time of
promising, the activation of the focal goal was lower when
positive affect was experienced as compared to when
neutral affect was experienced. However, when competing
goals were not present at the time of promising, the acti-
vation of the focal goal was greater in the positive affect
condition than in the neutral affect condition. The data
suggest that competing goals provide the motivation to
shift resources away from the focal goal to the competing
goals. This shift is possible when positive affect can serve
as information indicating goal progress. When no com-
peting goals are present, positive affect serves as infor-
mation suggesting that the actor is on the right track
towards achievement of the focal goal and should continue
moving toward it because the focal goal is the sole concern.
In support of the notion that positive affect serves the role
of feedback information, the presence of competing goals
only mattered when positive, but not neutral, affect was
induced.
Experiment 2
Our second experiment was designed to conceptually rep-
licate the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst experiment using a mea-
sure of participants’ behavioral intentions rather than a goal
activation measure (determined from reaction times).
Using a behavioral intentions measure allowed us to test
whether positive affect is likely to have an impact beyond
goal activation on subsequent goal-directed behavior.
Additionally, in the control condition, in which competing
goals were not present, participants listed three colors
rather than three things they had already accomplished that
day.
Method
Participants
Seventy-eight undergraduates at the University of Mary-
land (40 female, 38 male) participated in exchange for
partial course credit. Participants were 18–29 years of age,
with a mean age of 20.
Procedure
The procedure for this study was identical to Experiment 1
except for the manipulation of competing goals and the
measure of behavioral intentions rather than goal activa-
tion. Participants again generated an interpersonal goal and
entered one word into the computer to represent this goal.
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Fig. 1 The effect of affect and competing goals on the activation of
the focal goal (Experiment 1)
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sented with the same pictures pre-tested to elicit either
positive or neutral affect.
Competing goals
Prior to promising to complete their focal goal, participants
in the competing goals condition listed three things they
would like to do later that day. Participants in the control
condition listed three colors.
Behavioral intentions
Participants completed a measure of their behavioral
intentions regarding the promised goal. Participants
responded to two items, ‘‘I plan to complete the goal I
wrote about’’ and ‘‘I intend to complete the goal I wrote
about’’ on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all)
to 9 (very much). Because these items were highly corre-
lated (r = .94, p\.001), we averaged them to create a
composite score.
Results and discussion
A 2 (affect: positive vs. neutral) 9 2 (competing goals:
presence vs. absence) between-subjects ANOVA was
conducted to test our hypothesis. We found a signiﬁcant
main effect of competing goals, F(1, 74) = 5.58, p\.05
indicating less strong behavioral intentions were held when
competing goals were present (M = 7.73, SD = .18) than
when competing goals were absent (M = 8.32, SD = .18).
More importantly, we found the predicted two-way inter-
action between affect and competing goals, F(1, 74) =
10.23, p\.01. As shown in Fig. 2, behavioral intentions
regarding the focal goal were weaker in the positive affect
condition (M = 7.30, SD = .25) than in the neutral affect
condition (M = 8.16, SD = .26) when competing goals
were present, t(74) = 2.39, p\.05. In contrast, when
competing goals were absent, behavioral intentions were
stronger in the positive affect condition (M = 8.70,
SD = .25) than in the neutral affect condition (M = 7.95,
SD = .26), t(74) = 2.10, p\.05.
Additionally, we expected to conceptually replicate the
ﬁnding from Experiment 1 in which competing goals had an
impact in the positive affect condition, but not in the neutral
affect condition. That is, when positive affect was experi-
enced after promising to complete the goal, it should lead to
stronger behavioral intentions whenno competing goals had
been activated as compared to when competing goals had
been activated. However, in the neutral affect condition, the
actor is devoid of information to make inferences regarding
progress or commitment to the goal, which should eliminate
any difference between these two conditions. Conﬁrming
this prediction, behavioral intentions after experiencing
positive affect were lower in the competing goals condition
(M = 7.30, SD = .25) than when competing goals were not
activated (M = 8.70, SD = .25), t(74) = 3.95, p\.001.
However, there was no effect of competing goals in the
neutral affect condition, t(74) = .58, ns.
The results from Experiment 2 conceptually replicate
the ﬁndings in Experiment 1. These results provide further
evidence that the presence versus absence of competition
for resources from alternative goals represents a critical
moderator determining how positive affect inﬂuences goal
activation. When competing goals are activated, positive
(vs. neutral) affect led to decreased goal activation. When
competing goals are not activated, positive (vs. neutral)
affect led to increased goal activation.
General discussion
In two experiments, we tested the impact of positive affect
as informational feedback in goal pursuit. In each study, we
had participants promise to complete a goal. In Experiment
1, we found that induced positive affect (vs. neutral affect)
led to lesser activation of the focal goal when competing
goals were present. However, induced positive affect (vs.
neutral affect) led to greater activation of the focal goal
when competing goals were absent. Experiment 2 repli-
cated this pattern of results with behavioral intentions
rather than a reaction time measure of goal activation
serving as the dependent variable.
We found that when positive affect is experienced after
a promise to complete a goal, it sometimes leads to a
decrease in activation of the goal, but sometimes leads to
an increased or maintained activation of the goal. We
showed that when a competition for resources from
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Fig. 2 The effect of affect and competing goals on behavioral
intentions following a promise (Experiment 2)
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to neutral affect, led to lesser activation of the focal goal.
This competition presumably led to a motivation to infer
progress on the focal goal so that the actor could shift
resources to the competing goals. Positive affect, because it
is often experienced when goals are attained, can serve as
such feedback information. However, when no such com-
petition from alternative goals was present, positive (vs.
neutral) affect led to greater focal goal activation.
Our results point to the ﬂexibility with which positive
affect can be used as information to infer the current status
of goal pursuit. That is, positive affect can serve as infor-
mation to suggest both goal progress and goal commitment.
Other types of information, such as the speciﬁc behaviors
enacted, have also been shown to be interpreted in a sim-
ilarly ﬂexible manner (Fishbach and Dhar 2006). Previous
research has focused on the cognitive interpretation of
progress-related information, whereas our research exam-
ined the motivated use of such information. When the actor
is motivated to infer progress because of the competition
for resources from alternative goals, positive affect is more
likely to lead to decreased goal activation. However, when
the actor is motivated to infer commitment because the
focal goal is the sole concern, positive affect is more likely
to lead to increased goal activation. It seems that the
motivated use of feedback information to infer progress on
the focal goal is one strategy that people use to deal with
the resources demands when multiple goals are active.
One limitation with the current experiments is that
participants’goal-directed behavior was not measured.
Instead, we measured the momentary activation of the
goals and behavioral intentions. Yet, we have every reason
to believe that the same pattern of ﬁndings would be
observed if a behavioral measured were employed. This is
because the link between goal activation and goal pursuit
has been found to be quite robust. Theories of goal pursuit
assume that goals will be pursued to the extent that they are
activated (e.g., Bargh 1990;F o ¨rster et al. 2007; Kruglanski
1996a; Kruglanski et al. 2002). Experimental evidence for
this claim comes from priming studies demonstrating that
the priming of a goal (thereby increasing its’ activation)
causes increased goal-consistent behavior (e.g., Bargh et al.
2001; Chartrand and Bargh 1996). Not only is the resulting
behavior consistent with the goal, but the goal activation
had been shown to lead to goal commitment (Bargh et al.
2001), as shown through persistance in the face of obsta-
cles and resumption of the goal following an interruption.
The measurement of behavioral intentions in addition to
the mere activation of the goal provides further evidence
suggesting that the present framework would apply to the
actual pursuit of the goal. Even so, future research could
proﬁtably explore the present framework using behavioral
measures of goal pursuit.
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